University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
1974

Grievance Procedures in Federal Prisons: Practices and Proposals
Howard Lesnick
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Criminology Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, and the Public Policy
Commons

Repository Citation
Lesnick, Howard, "Grievance Procedures in Federal Prisons: Practices and Proposals" (1974). Faculty
Scholarship at Penn Law. 1416.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1416

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

University of Pennsylvania
Law Review
FOUNDED 1852

Formerly
American Law Register
VOLUME

123

NOVEMBER

1974

NUMBER

1

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL
PRISONS: PRACTICES AND PROPOSALS*
HOWARD

LESNICKt

Proposals to establish or improve methods by which prisoners may bring requests or complaints to prison officials or others
for fair consideration of their merits are much in the air today.
Some see in such notions the hope of fending off increased
inmate resort to the courts, others have primarily in mind the
prevention of violent disruptions, and there are some who support the idea "simply" on the grounds of its justice. This Article
examines existing procedures in federal prisons (and a few state
prision experiences which are particularly concerned with relevant current issues, but which lacked counterparts in federal intitutions as of late 1973), and tries to evaluate current practices
and proposed reforms. The procedure employed was to visit a
number of institutions, principally those for long term inmates,
and to speak with people, both inmates and staff, having a variety of inputs-senior corrections officers; persons involved with
classification and assignment; correctional counselors; staff con* This Article is based on a report prepared for the Committee on Informal Action of
the Administrative Conference of the United States. The views expressed are my own
only. I profited from the assistance of Steven G. Scott, Esq., of the Oregon Bar. I appreciate the cooperation of many inmates and staff members at a number of prisons,
and especially that of Eugene Barkin, Esq., General Counsel of the Federal Bureau
of Prisons.
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1952, New York University; A.M. 1953, Columbia University; LL.B. 1958, Columbia University. Member,
New York and Pennsylvania Bars.
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cerned with custodial and disciplinary matters; persons involved
in supplying legal resources and law books, including librarians
and jailhouse lawyers; members of inmate representation committees; and persons associated with the office of the General
Counsel of the Bureau of Prisons-and to review such file data
as is available (principally that dealing with the forfeiture of
"good time").
Two conditioning factors should be borne in mind. First, we
are dealing with the administrative process at its most informal.
Even the word "procedure" tends to conjure up in lawyers'
minds an unrealistically formal affair. A "grievance" is often
"processed" by means of a corridor conversation between an
inmate and a staff member, with no written account made or
preserved. Necessarily, data can only be gathered through interviews and observation, and is impressionistic and relatively unquantifiable in many areas.' Second, the routine caveat against
easy solutions nowhere needs constant recollection more than in
dealing with prisons. The extraordinary isolation of prisons and
prison life from the thoughts of most Americans, and the national unwillingness to spend money (except for "security"); the
polarization of feelings, experiences and values between inmates
and the correctional bureaucracy; the characteristic of prisons as
"total institutions," in which every moment of the inmate's life
and virtually every act or statement is subject to some part of the
regulatory pattern-these and other factors make one sharply
aware of the intractability of the problems.
The first and second sections of this Article describe the
various institutions within the federal prison system which regulate an inmate's life, and the several mechanisms by which a
request or complaint-a "grievance"-may be presented and
considered. The third section attempts to evaluate the existing
structure and several currently mooted modes of improved
grievance mechanisms: arbitrators, ombudspeople, citizens'
panels, inmate councils and inmate paralegal training. I shall
offer some skeptical conclusions about the first three ideas, and
some affirmative ones about the latter two.
'For this reason, and because conditions are so fluid at most prisons, I have not identified particular institutions by name in discussing practices. They are not confidential,
however, and I would be glad to supply more precise information to anyone requesting it.
The descriptions and perceptions set forth in this Article are presented not clothed with
the scholarly "proofs" some are accustomed to. Needless to say, I think that they are accurate; needless also to say, my belief may be ill-founded; I hope that the reader who thinks
so will base his or her belief on something other than the absence per se of such proof.
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I.
A.

THE REGULATION OF INMATE LIFE

The Classificationand Parole Unit

In most institutions, the Classification and Parole Unit has
authority over the bulk of the decisions most crucial to the life of
an inmate. The level of custody deemed appropriate will determine whether an inmate can spend none, some, or all of his
time outside the walls working or living at the "camp" or "farm"
which adjoins many prisons. Closely related is the housing assignment: whether or not the inmate will be assigned to housing
with a window (and a view of the outside) or with greater freedom to come and go. An inmate's job assignment is critical in a
number of respects. First, working conditions are obviously less
appealing (to most) in the laundry or the kitchen than in the
library or the machine shop. In addition, some but not all jobs
may earn the inmate "meritorious pay" and "meritorious good
time'-the latter term referring to an extra, discretionary reduction in sentence, beyond the statutory allowance to which an
inmate is entitled, unless it is forfeited or withheld in disciplinary
proceedings. 2 Inmate requests for interinstitution transfer likewise are within the jurisdiction-although here only the initial
jurisdiction-of this unit. Finally, it is from Classification and
Parole that the institution's recommendation regarding parole
effectively emanates-a recommendation which apparently
presages the Parole Board's decision in about three-quarters
of the cases.
The procedure by which this pervasive authority is exercised varies somewhat from one institution to another. A committee-variously called a "classification committee," "treatment
team," or some similar term-typically makes the decision. In
some facilities, a single committee acts in all cases; it may be
comprised of an associate warden, the chief correctional supervisor (captain of the guard force), the chief of Classification and
Parole and one or two "department" heads, such as the supervisor of education or industries. In others, a decentralized approach is employed: the individual case manager and correctional counselor to whom the inmate in question is assigned, plus
a case management or correctional supervisor, might comprise
the committee. In all cases however, individual case managers sit
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 4126, 4161, 4162, & 4165 (1970); see U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, POLICY STATEMENT

7600.50A,

MERITORIOUS GOOD TIME

(1971).
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in with the committee and have the responsibility to "work up"
each agendum in advance, presenting the case to the meeting
with a recommendation. In fact, I had the sense that a case
manager has discretion to deny an inmate's request for a change
in job, housing or custody without even bringing it to the committee. The inmates' perception that case manager support is a
sine qua non of committee approval may be exaggerated-he is
the person with whom they deal-but it seems clear that his
function as presenter of the case does make him the single most
critical input.
An inmate typically is given an opportunity to appear before
the committee in certain types of cases-initial classification and
(in some institutions) parole recommendations, but not usually in
reclassification cases or transfers-but he is called in after the
case has been discussed and a committee response formulated;
the appearance serves more to give the inmate some chance to
hear the reasons for the action and to voice his reactions, than to
provide a genuine input into the decision itself.
B. Disciplinary Proceedings
1. The Adjustment Committee
The primary disciplinary body in federal prisons is the Adjustment Committee. 3 It has initial jurisdiction over all matters
regarded by the institution as disciplinary which are not disposed
of informally by the custodial staff. Its composition varies somewhat from institution to institution; the captain, the chief of
Classification and Parole, and either another senior custodial official or a department head (education, hospital, industry) would
comprise a typical Adjustment Committee. Including department heads serves the purposes of exposing inmates to personnel other than custodial and case management staff, and of exposing the department heads to the disciplinary process and its
problems. The associate warden, although never a member of
the Adjustment Committee, in many cases participates in its deliberations, either as an advisor or simply as an observer. The
regulations permit a wide range of sanctions, including reprimand, restrictions of various privileges related to the offense
I See U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEP'T OFJUSTICE, POLICY STATEMENT 7400.5B, INMATE
DISCIPLINE (1972). Sections 4A and 4B contain the substantive rules of conduct enforced
by disciplinary proceedings; sections 4C and 5 deal with the Adjustment Committee.
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(such as visiting rights), segregation, loss of favorable custody,
housing or job classifications, and the recommendation of loss of
good time credits. 4 The committee has final authority, subject to
the warden's power of review, in all cases but the last.
Inmates charged with an offense to be brought before the
Adjustment Committee must be given a written specification of
charges, signed by the custodial official who investigated the
complaint. This official is usually a lieutenant (correctional
supervisor) to whom the officer making the complaint is required to refer the matter prior to the filing of written charges
and the convening of an Adjustment Committee. When the inmate has been placed in segregation pending a hearing, the rules
require that he be given a written statement of charges within
twenty-four hours. 5 The lieutenant includes as part of his report the inmate's response to the charge, if any.
The hearing is moderately informal. The committee chairman reads the investigative report to the members before the
inmate is brought into the room. (In my observation, the case
was not discussed by the members at that time.) When the inmate appears, the investigative report is read to him in full and
he is asked if he has anything to say. It is not the Adjustment
Committee's practice to summon witnesses in support of the
complaint; in effect the hearsay statement of the report is regarded as evidence. If the inmate denies the factual allegations,
the committee will discuss them with him, but it is not customary
to summon witnesses to challenge his version of the case. In the
rare event that the hearing discloses a genuine doubt as to what
happened, the committee may decide to adjourn the hearing.
Even then the response is not to obtain live witnesses, but rather
to return the matter to the lieutenant who made the investigation with instructions to investigate and report further in writing. It is not inconceivable that the committee would decide to
call a custodial official or other administration witness before it,
but I believe that this is rarely done.
The inmate is not afforded any right of representation be4 One should also add that the Adjustment Committee can recommend transfer.
While transfer for "adjustment" reasons is not regarded as a disciplinary matter, and is
processed through Classification and Parole, the Warden's office and the central office,
with little or no inmate notice and participation, the process is often set in motion by an
incident which is brought before the Adjustment Committee. See text following note 3
supra.
See POLICY STATEMENT 7400.5B, supra note 3, at § 5(c)(1).
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fore the Adjustment Committee. Nor do the rules specifically
provide a right to summon witnesses in his behalf. However, as a
discretionary matter such a request is sometimes granted.
After the interview with the inmate is completed, he leaves
the room and the case is discussed. Since the committee does not
view itself as in any way a court, discussion is not necessarily
limited to material before it as "evidence." For example, in one
case I observed, an inmate charged with violating the regulation
permitting one to kiss his wife at the beginning and end of a
visit, "within the bounds of good taste,' 6 claimed that the duty
officer in the visiting room had been harassing him, and had
been looking for an excuse to report him. During the posthearing discussion all agreed that the particular officer in question,
far from being vindictive, was an unusually patient man, and
that if he thought it necessary to file an incident report the
matter must have been serious indeed. In many cases, the committee draws upon its knowledge of the inmate, other inmates
and staff members, and would be quite shocked to hear that it
should do otherwise.
It is clear that the members of Adjustment Committees do
not place as great a store on a finding of guilt as do courts and
lawyers. They view their primary function as dispositional and
managerial. Accordingly, the main issue is one of sanctions. The
committee is required to meet three times each week; where an
inmate has been placed in segregation his case must be reviewed
at least weekly. In some cases, the committee uses segregation in
a way which is a mixture of sanction and investigation. For example, an inmate involved in a fight who refused to disclose his
assailant, having been placed in segregation pending the hearing, was ordered continued in segregation until the next review.
Technically, there was no decision, although obviously as a
practical matter he was being punished in this manner for the
nondisclosure. Even this characterization could be questioned,
however, since a contributing motivation may well have been the
desire to keep the disputants apart for a time. Segregation is
often used in this way, without necessarily suggesting blame.
Even when segregation is used as a sanction, it is not in theory
imposed for an extended period, because of the requirement of
periodic review. In practice, however, inmates are sometimes
6 U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICY STATEMENT
REGULATIONS,

§ 5(h)(4) (1972).

7300.4A,

VISITING

1974]

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL PRISONS

held involuntarily in segregation for long periods of time. The
stated rationale is that, based on the most current review, release
to the general population would not be in the best interests of
all; however, I was not able to get any precise idea of actual
motivations.
I attempted to gain some sense of the standards used to
select particular sanctions. However, this is not an easy matter to
grasp. The answers I was given were true enough, but not very
helpful: a consideration of all of the factors, the best interests of
the inmate and the institution as a whole. In general, I think it
true that segregation is used as an interim and short term sanction for aggressive (although often only marginally aggressive)
behavior, but that it is more often imposed administratively
through the prehearing process than as an avowed sanction.
Loss of favorable housing and custody is typically imposed for a
violation which suggests a security problem in any way, including
forbidden transactions with the outside world. The standard
sanction thought appropriate for cases deemed serious is the loss
of good time; in a sense the Adjustment Committee's "gravest"
sanction is to decide that the matter is appropriate for referral to
a Good Time Forfeiture Board.
The procedure employed tends to impart some regularity of
sanction. As noted, at least three, and sometimes five, staff
members sit on the Adjustment Committee, and the associate
warden typically is involved to a substantial degree as an
observer-advisor. Cases are discussed at the meeting, and the
matter, as I indicated above, is treated as one of management.
Accordingly, there is a fairly significant built-in regularizer
within a given institution, at least on the conscious level; each
official, I believe, feels the need to be consistent in his reactions,
and to explain them to his peers. It should be clear, however,
that such pressures as operate are only those which are selfgenerated within the committee itself.
2. The Good Time Forfeiture Board
The Good Time Forfeiture Board is typically composed of
senior staff people, the associate wardens and the captain being
a likely complement. 7 Any member of the board who sat on the
Adjustment Committee hearing of a particular case will be re7 See U.S.

BUREAU OF PRISONS, DFP'T OFJUSTICE, POLICY STATEMENT

HOLDING, FORFEITURE, AND RESTORATION OF GOOD TIME

(1971).

7400.6A, WITH-
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placed for the Forfeiture Board hearing of that case. The
board's decision whether to take away "good time" and, if so,
how much, are in the form of recommendations to the warden.
In general, the procedures followed by the Good Time Forfeiture Board are similar to those used by the Adjustment Committee. The primary difference is that, before the board, an
inmate is entitled to the assistance of a staff representative. Apparently this option is exercised in about one-half of the cases,
the inmate typically selecting a correctional counselor or work
supervisor as his representative. The representative seems to
serve primarily as a character witness and not as counsel.
It should be apparent that in a number of senses, the Good
Time Forfeiture Board is reviewing decisions already made. It
has the incident report and the report of the Adjustment Committee before it. The Adjustment Committee has of course already made a finding of culpability. Even as to the sanction, the
very convening of the board represents a determination by the
Adjustment Committee that forfeiture of good time is probably
appropriate. This is not to say that the board never decides not
to forfeit time, but I believe that such an outcome is rare. The
primary question usually is how much time should be taken.
Here too it was difficult to find any clear guidelines. At least one
institution's board seems to regard the amount of time taken as
largely determined by the amount of time an inmate has to his
credit; that is to say, given a sufficiently serious offense, the
board will take away all of the time an inmate has accumulated,
unless there are two related cases before it at the same time with
widely disparate accumulated times involved. Most boards, however, seem to give less weight to the amount of time an inmate
has accrued.
The issue is less significant than would appear, however, for
the reason that the forfeiture of good time is used as a control
mechanism, and the expectation is that it will be restored. Indeed, it must be restored for the inmate to have any hope of a
favorable response from the Board of Parole, whose practice
apparently is not to consider seriously a case where there is any
good time forfeited which has not been restored. Therefore, the
loss of a year, rather than ninety days, is of significance only on
the assumption that parole is going to be denied and an inmate
will be continued in custody until mandatory release. Where an
inmate is hoping for favorable parole action, he must get the
time restored, whatever it may be.
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Recommending the restoration of good time is within the
jurisdiction of a classification committee or treatment team, and
not the Good Time Forfeiture Board. In general, an inmate
must have a year of clear conduct in order to expect to have his
forfeited time restored. Where substantial time was forfeited,
some institutions will typically restore only part of it, using the
balance as a means of inducing further months of clear conduct.
Accordingly, there is some significance in the amount of time
forfeited, since it may take substantially more than a year in
order for an inmate to clear his record in serious cases.
When the board has recommended forfeiture and the war-,
den has acted on that recommendation, the inmate may appeal
to the office of the General Counsel in Washington. There were
between fifty and seventy-five such appeals during the first year
of the program's operation, and I was given the opportunity to
review the files. General Counsel review is for the purpose of
determining whether regulations were complied with, as disclosed on the face of the report of the board and the letter
provided by the inmate. Of course where the crucial question is
factual, affirmance is a foregone conclusion. Nor do I believe
that the General Counsel would reverse on the ground that the
penalty was excessive. He might, however, while affirming, advise the warden that he should consider restoration. In fact, this
device of affirmance-with-remonstrance was used in one case
where the inmate had not been advised of his right to representation, as required; the General Counsel affirmed on the ground
that there was no prejudice since the inmate had pleaded guilty
(to having been drunk and in a fight), but a blind carbon to the
warden recommended that the time be restored. The distinction
between reversal of the forfeiture and later restoration of the
time forfeited, so important to the legal tradition, is obviously
not given substantial weight among prison authorities. One case
which did end in actual reversal (although by the time of the
appeal the inmate had already been transferred to another institution) involved an admission on the face of the report that
the inmate's request to call exculpatory witnesses, which the regulations specifically grant, was rejected.
3.

The Role of the Correctional Supervisor

In many ways the most important fact to bear in mind about
the allocation of authority in disciplinary proceedings is that
much actual authority is exercised one step below the level at
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which it formally appears to be placed. An absolutely critical
official is the correctional supervisor, the lieutenant. First, it is he
who makes the initial decision whether the matter in question is
sufficiently serious to treat as an Adjustment Committee issue, or
whether a "minor" incident report should be prepared and an
informal sanction applied by him. In effect, he has final authority to treat the case in this informal manner. If a report is filed, it
must go to the Adjustment Committee for review, but it is not
ordinarily discussed; and I have the feeling that review of decisions in this area is thought of more as a managerial than an
adjudicatory process: that is, if a particular lieutenant is too lenient in this regard, the captain will see to it that his future
actions are brought into line with institutional policy.
The inmates far preter informal modes of sanctions, in part
of course since they cannot be terribly serious-reprimand and
extra duty are the ones I heard mentioned-but primarily because of the feeling that one's parole chances are hurt by even
relatively minor Adjustment Committee actions, and that this
8
is not so where there has been no referral to the committee.
Should Adjustment Committee action be warranted, the
lieutenant is the person who makes the next critical decision:
whether or not the inmate is to be placed in segregation pending
a hearing. There are general guidelines, such as the seriousness
of the offense or its potential for violence, but obviously there is
a fair amount of discretion here. So far as I can tell, the single
most important factor influencing this decision is whether there
is any pattern of "acting out" in the inmate's actions. I use a
phrase such as this rather than violence because it should be
realized that the slightest show of aggressiveness or even assertiveness is viewed very seriously by prison authorities. In one
case I observed, two inmates were accused of similar offenses
-the one referred to earlier, involving unauthorized kissing of
one's wife during a visit. One, who simply accepted the incident
report without comment, was permitted to remain in general
population pending the Adjustment Committee hearing. The
other crumpled the paper in his hand, threw it on the floor and
said that he was innocent and a victim of the visiting-room
8 1 do not know whether this perception is accurate, since the report goes into the
inmate's file and is available to the Parole Board in any event, but it is the fact, at the one
institution having an inmate representation committee, that one of the accomplishments
of which it was most pleased was the growing acceptance by staff of the feasibility of using
this mode of dealing with relatively minor violations.
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officer's hostility. He was placed in segregation pending the
hearing; the official attitude toward this conduct was reflected in
the captain's offhand reference, during the hearing, to his having "raised cain." 9
Finally, one should bear in mind the obvious importance of
the fact that it is the lieutenant who has the responsibility for the
complainant's report. Since there are typically no witnesses in
support of the complaint produced at the hearings, the report is
of great significance to the outcome.' 0
II.
A.

AN INMATE WITH A GRIEVANCE

Case Managers and CorrectionalCounselors

An inmate who has a request or a complaint has a variety of
means for raising it. The primary avenue is the inmate's case
manager. The case manager, as the representative of Classification and Parole, has initial jurisdiction over most substantial
questions affecting the inmate's life, and is generally thought to
be the proper person to speak with first about almost any matter.
He has "open house" for an hour each day, but this is obviously
too short a time to permit everyone with a problem to raise it
there. Appointments are possible at other times, but there is a
fairly general inmate feeling that case managers are relatively
inaccessible. Their caseload varies from one institution to
another but a caseload well in excess of one hundred inmates is
not unusual.
For about two years many institutions have employed "correctional counselors." These are typically former officers, who
are relieved from custodial duties and assigned full-time to keep
in regular touch with inmate life. They have no office or administrative responsibilities, and are freely available to inmates.
They move around where the people are, and in at least some
9 Compare the captain's language with the seemingly narrower language of § 3(c) of
Policy Statement 7400.5B, supra note 3, which speaks of segregation as an immediate control device "when it is determined that [inmates] constitute a threat to themselves,
to others, or the safety and security of the institution," or as a response to a "willful
refusal to obey an order or demonstrated defiance ...."
10 One might note a similar downward shifting of authority in connection with the
forfeiture of "good time." Technically, the Adjustment Committee does not decide this,
but it seems obvious that its recommendation will be given substantial weight. At the least
it has the job of deciding whether the matter is to be regarded as not appropriate for a good
time forfeiture. In theory, the Warden can convene a Forfeiture Board even though the
Adjustment Committee has not recommended it, but that is obviously not going to happen
in any but the most unusual case.
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cases work a shift from eleven in the morning to seven in the
evening. (The rest of the staff usually ends its work day at four
or four-thirty in the afternoon.) Counselors have very little authority to act, except in such "minor" matters as authorizing
outside telephone calls, but they serve an extremely important
function in advising inmates about the way to process a request
or, in some cases, personally taking up a matter on the inmate's
behalf with the case manager or other staff members.
The effect of this new position has apparently been very
substantial, far more so than its rather prosaic name would suggest. Inmates and staff alike laud the concept. Nor has the fact
that the position is generally staffed from among custodial per-'
sonnel proved a drawback to inmate acceptance. Few staff members know prison life as well as a former "hack," and taking
away his uniform and custodial responsibility has in many cases
seemed to work a startling change in his perceptions. While it
is certainly an exaggeration to say that counselors regard themselves as advocates for the inmate, I believe there is some incipient feeling akin to this-certainly far more so than with respect to any other position in the bureaucracy of a correctional
institution.
B. Older Written Procedures
There have been two avenues for presenting a request or
complaint in writing, and a third has recently been initiated.
The "cop out," an informal written statement which may be addressed to any staff member, is the traditional prison method of
registering a complaint or making a request. Large numbers of
these are used routinely. What happens after a "cop out" is received varies widely from staff member to staff member and
institution to institution. Official policy is to encourage staff to
respond, whether orally or in writing, but the pressure of time
and case load makes this an episodic reality at best. Here again,
the correctional counselor has often served a useful role by following up a "cop out" and obtaining an answer, perhaps even a
reason, more easily than the inmate could.
In addition, there is the Prisoner's Mail Box. Each institution maintains a locked box into which an inmate may drop a
letter to designated officials; such letters are mailed without
passing through prison surveillance or censorhip. 11 These offi" See

U.S. BUREAU OF
Box (1974).

ONIER'S MAIL

PRISONS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICY STATEMENT

7300.2C, PRIS-
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cials include judges, congressmen, and the Central Office of the
Bureau of Prisons in Washington. Mail addressed to the Bureau
is referred to the office of the General Counsel, and many
judges and other government officials follow the practice of forwarding to that office mail addressed to them. An attempt is
made to answer each letter, typically by describing the regulation
or practice which justifies what was done. In some cases, the
General Counsel may request information from the institution
involved, and in a few cases-for example, credible allegations of
sexual abuse-an independent investigation is undertaken.
I read a representative sample of letters which came in to
the central office through the Prisoner's Mail Box during a particular week (they are not retained once answered). They involved such matters as transfer questions, complaints about theft
of property, denial of funeral leave, and requests for legal assistance regarding "outside" civil problems. I think it is fair to say
that the institution is seen as serving primarily a therapeutic,
"safety valve" function, rather than prompting any review of the
merits of the actions complained of. The director of the Bureau
of Prisons has said, in a statement to a House committee, that
"routine requests which do not involve the deprivation of legal
rights such as a request to be transferred to an institution closer
to home or to a work release program are sent to the appro12
priate Bureau Division for disposition."'
Of course, to the extent that inquiry is made of institution
personnel regarding the complaint, the confidentiality of the
communication may be compromised. I received no intimation,
however, that inmates were intimidated by this possibility, and,
so far as I could tell, the staff did not regard inmate use of the
Prisoner's Mail Box as per se a hostile act.
C. The New Complaint Procedure
The Bureau of Prisons recently adopted a program which
will require written answers to all grievances. A policy statement
to this effect was prepared and discussed extensively with staff,
and was scheduled for system wide inauguration on July 1, 1973.
It was held in abeyance, however, and then ordered implemented as of September first on a four-month experimental
basis in three designated institutions. It became effective on a
'2Hearingson Corrections Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 15, pt. III, at 118 (1971) (statement of Norman Carlson).
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system wide basis as of April 1, 1974.13 A principal purpose
appears to be to provide a readily ascertainable way to tell
whether administrative remedies have been exhausted, where
legal proceedings are in process or contemplated. There will
now be a written record of inmate attempts to obtain internal
redress and of the institution's response.
The procedure is quite simple. An inmate obtains a form
from a correctional counselor, writes out his complaint and submits it. Within three weeks in the case of intrainstitution matters,
and six weeks in the case of complaints addressed to the central
office, a written reply on the same form is to be provided. In ten
weeks or more, therefore, the inmate will have exhausted his
administrative remedies, and will have put the institution on record as to the reason for the action about which he complained.
The draft policy statement originally said that the warden or his
designee should "clearly indicate" the facts underlying a denial,
but the final version does not contain even this general aim; it
states only that the response "should be based upon facts, and
should deal only with the issue raised, and not include extrane14
ous material."'
D. Inmate Councils
Only one institution for longer term offenders had a functioning inmate representation committee during the period of
this study. There, an elected group met regularly with designated staff members to discuss items placed on the agenda by
the inmate committee. Matters were sometimes disposed of at
one meeting, but often inmate initiation of a request prompted
consideration of a matter within the staff and resulted in a series
of discussions. It was the only instance which came to my attention in which there seemed to be a genuine input into decisionmaking from the inmate side, and there were a number of instances of policy changes made, gradually, as a result of these
meetings. The subjects covered such disparate matters as liberalization of the rules regarding outside telephone calls; improvements in the law library; guidelines for attorney visits;
institution and liberalization of a furlough policy for inmates
1 U.S.
TRATIVE

BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICY STATEMENT 2001.6, ADMINIS-

REMEDY

FACILITIES (1974).

14Id.§ 5.

OF COMPLAINTS

INITIATED

By

OFFENDERS IN

BUREAU

OF PRISONS

1974]

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL PRISONS

approaching release date; unescorted trips on Easter Sunday;
improvement in the quality and manner of service of food distributed through vending machines; greater use of informal
methods of discipline; continued commitment to work-release
programs; and assignment of more Black and Spanish-speaking
case workers.
The staff seemed to have adjusted to the notion of bargaining with inmates, and to have accepted the often spirited interchange which necessarily accompanies this process. However,
shortly after a change in top level administrators at the facility,
the committee members resigned following a dispute over a decision to move the visiting room to smaller quarters. The inmates' view was that the resignations were caused by administration unresponsiveness, while the staff maintained that the failure
of an attempted work stoppage occasioned the resignations. An
attempt to reactivate the committee several months later failed.
This time there was actually a brief work stoppage, and the
committee resigned after it was terminated by a general
"lockup"-a critical meeting between the committee and the associate warden scheduled to convene just before the strike having failed to materialize. In every other institution I visited, the
administration is implacably opposed to even the concept of inmate representation committees. In most, an inmate council apparently existed at one time but was disbanded, typically as part
of the administration's response to a work stoppage or other
demonstration led by people who had postions of leadership in
the inmate organization.
E. Legal Assistance
In one sense the unavailability of legal assistance may be
viewed as itself a grievance, rather than a "procedure" for dealing with grievances. One may also assert, however, that the
grievance is the issue about which legal help is sought-the existence of a detainer,1 5 the denial of a transfer, or whateverand the availability of law-trained help is a crucial part of the
method by which an inmate may resolve the grievance. Conceptually both perspectives are accurate, but for present purposes
the second is clearly the more responsive to the issue; I there"' That is, a writ issued by a court, authorizing the keeper of a prison to keep (detain)
a person in custody beyond the normal time for his release, usually because other charges
are pending.
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fore want to consider practices and proposals in the area of
16
legal assistance.
A Bureau policy statement on the subject of access to legal
counsel and books makes clear that inmates are not to be disciplined by reason of their resort to court, and are not to be
17
prevented from helping one another with their legal problems.
In addition, the statement sets out a list of law books which each
institution is required to provide, and says a little about maintenance of the collection. Beyond this, the Bureau is interested in
working with law schools which might provide student or other
assistance to inmates on the scene. Through the work of the
General Counsel's office, programs like this have been active, at
one time or another, at most of the larger institutions.
Moving from Bureau policy to actual local practices, I think
it is generally true that inmates are not interfered with in their
attempts to file court papers, use such materials as are available,
and have the help of whatever jailhouse lawyers the particular
institution has at the time. My general sense was that most officials recognize that prisoners are entitled to access to courts, that
jailhouse lawyers are viewed as no worse than a necessary evil
and perhaps in some cases even of some therapeutic value, and
that there is not a serious problem of restraint.
The real problem, however, only becomes exposed when
official discouragement of access to law ceases. The fact is that
most prisoners simply do not have minimally adequate resources
within their reach. There are wide variations in the usability of
the law libraries, although they may in fact have the books required by the Bureau policy statement. Maintaining a collection
of legal materials current and functionally organized obviously
takes continuing attention, and prison staff librarians are not, to
my knowledge, trained in law librarianship. Inmates are sometimes assigned to this task, but although some inmates can do the
job quite creatively and effectively, many cannot.
So far as legal assistance goes, the law student programs
have foundered seriously because of difficulties not of the institutions' making. Most prisons are simply not close enough to
16 See Resource

Center on Correctional Law and Legal Services, Providing Legal

Services to Prisoners, 8 GA. L. REv. 363 (1974) (ABA Comm'n on Correctional Facilities
and Services).
17 See U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICY STATEMENT 2001.2B, AcCESS TO LEGAL REFERENCE MATERIALS AND LEGAL COUNSEL AND PREPARATION OF LEGAL

DOCUMENTS (1972).
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an adequate source of law student resources, and where a connection is made, distance may insure its speedy demise. Beyond
that, law school programs themselves are typically not reliable
over the long run. Student availability is at the mercy of the
calendar, and student interest waxes and wanes, often dependent on the presence and commitment of a particular professor
or staff attorney. Inmates have expressed resentment at being
represented by "unqualified" students. Whether this is a product
of actual lack of ability on the students' part, whether it is resentment at being represented by someone whom the Bar regards as qualified only to represent prisoners, or whether it
simply reflects the natural reaction of one who loses a case, the
fact remains that the morale problem is a serious one. Inmate
responses were not uniformly unfavorable, however; where students were available on the scene regularly, and seemed willing
and able to represent and advise the inmates in ways that could
be helpful to them, a positive reaction could be found. For example, the problem of clearing up detainers' 8 is one of enormous significance to the inmate's life, requiring only rudimentary legal knowledge and the willingness to put in some time;
students have done this, done it effectively, and earned the confidence of inmates as a result. This success generates its own
problems, in the form of a rising demand for help which soon
outruns the supply.
A few OEO-funded legal services offices seem to be attempting to develop prisoner assistance programs. In many
cases, even here, the problem of distance is again very serious.
Those offices are already burdened with a local caseload, and
simply cannot handle any kind of large-scale prisoner assistance
efforts. The local private bar is of course out of the question as
a realistic resource.
One Bureau of Prisons facility has a unique program, set up
under the auspices of the local district court. A magistrate, acting
in effect as a special master, sits full time at the institution and
both the U.S. Attorney and the public defender have full-time
attorneys assigned to prisoner litigation. Whatever the overall
effect of this program, it has two very unfortunate by-products:
the caseload is enormous and, because the jurisdictional bases of
federal court action so specify, the claims are necessarily cast in
terms of deprivation of constitutional rights. One illustration is a
" See

note 15 supra.
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suit challenging the institution's decision to strike the mother of
a former inmate from another inmate's visiting list on the
ground that it was improper for her, being a married woman, to
visit the prisoner unaccompanied by her husband, and challenging as well the filing of a groundless charge against the inmate,
which was later dismissed, but which cost him his single cell and
favored job while he was in prehearing segregation. It seems
clear that a program which takes real grievances and channels
them into dubious constitutional cases has serious drawbacks. I
would like to come back to this question below.
Finally, the institution of the jailhouse lawyer is one for
which it is very difficult for an outsider to get an accurate sense.
Prison authorities appear to tolerate them, and in some cases go
beyond this. At one large institution I visited, two jailhouse
lawyers maintain the law library collection in a corner of the
regular library and operate an active bibliographic and legal assistance service, with the full cooperation of the staff librarian.
In others, jailhouse lawyers hardly seem to be operating at all, or
they are people with the most minimal skills attempting as best
they can to piece together authority and procedure sufficient to
put some paper before a court. I obviously do not know whether
in the latter institutions there are inmates who could operate
more effectively were the official climate more hospitable. A
prisoner at one institution recently prepared a proposal to the
administration for an inmate-run legal assistance committee. It
involved very little money, but needed official encouragement. I
do not know what response he got, but in general prison authorities regard inmates' need for lawyers as relatively minimal,
and are most reluctant to give official status to such an inmates'
group.
III.

EVALUATION

One can fairly characterize the complaint mechanisms in the
federal prison system as designed largely to provide several avenues of communication from the inmate to the institution. The
case manager and correctional counselor, the "cop out" and
Prisoner's Mail Box, all provide means by which an inmate may
attempt to make his request or complaint known to the administration. They have the advantage of being multifaceted; and this
is an advantage of substance, because it is impossible to predict
in advance the best channel by which a particular complaint or
request may be voiced. To stop at this point, however, is to stop
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far short of anything which one may call a real grievance procedure.
At present, the Bureau is struggling with the questions
whether, in what circumstances, and by what means, the inmate
is to receive an answer to his request or complaint. First, some
institutions have recently adopted the policy, which others still
find objectionable, of informing the inmate whether or not he is
being recommended for parole to the Board of Parole. Second,
the institution of the correctional counselor has served, most
effectively, to overcome the difficulty a prisoner has in obtaining
a case manager's attention. In many cases he can now learn
through the counselor what the institution's answer or position
is, where he stands on a particular matter, and other relevant
information. Finally, the new complaint procedure, tentatively
tried in three institutions in 1973 and recently promulgated on a
system wide basis, is a substantial further step in this direction. It
requires, as a general practice, the provision of a written response on behalf of the institution to any complaint.
All of these are generally significant and important steps.
One cannot help remarking, however, on the extreme tentativeness and caution with which these steps are being taken; they are
obviously regarded as momentous decisions. Where the provision of a simple answer is the present frontier of development,
and its provision regarded as not so simple a matter, one would
not expect that further requisites of a meaningful grievance procedure would be readily observable.
What might such further requisites be? 19 There are endless
variables, but I think that in general they fall into two major
categories: (a) an independent or quasi-independent third-party
input, whether binding or advisory; (b) an input, going beyond
the mere statement of a request or complaint, by or on behalf of
the inmate. The first implicates such matters as arbitration, ombudsmen and citizens' councils; the second, inmate representation committees and legal or paralegal assistance. My present
opinion is that proposals in both areas find formidable obstacles
to their acceptability in the attitudes and values of prison offi'" No suggestion has been made that there is any constitutional requirement that a
grievance procedure exist, nor that it have any particular characteristics where it does
exist. Several courts have urged its utilization, e.g., Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135,
140-41 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 920 (1967); Dreyer v. Jalet, 349 F. Supp. 452,
488-91 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd mere., 479 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1973), but only by way of exhortation.
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cials, but that those of the first kind suffer as well from a misconception of the notion of a "grievance" in the prison world. I
will attempt to support these conclusions below, and then outline
some recommendations for implementing them. First, however,
20
I would like to speak briefly to the disciplinary area.
A.

Procedure in DisciplinaryCases

The Supreme Court has recently addressed the muchmooted issue of the extent to which the Due Process Clauses
require that particular procedural protections be afforded respondents in prison disciplinary proceedings. Wolff v. McDonnell2' lays down the following minimum standards in cases
involving loss of good time, disciplinary confinement ("solitary")
or other "major change in the conditions of confinement[,] ...
normally imposed only when it is claimed and proved that there
has been a major act of misconduct":2 2 (a) written notice of the
20 The relation of grievance procedures to disciplinary proceedings may be viewed
from two perspectives. The first is easy to see: If there are "grievances" about disciplinary
cases, reforms have to do with the substance of those cases, and not a procedure by which
they may be heard. There is substantial force to this view, but I think there is a certain
artificiality to it as well. Many disciplinary cases arise because of an inmate's response to
the manner in which a grievance is handled, and the decision to discipline an inmate for
his response is itself a mode of dealing with that grievance. Not all rules are always enforced in any area of life, particularly in one so all-enveloping as a prison. If particular
rules are deemed unduly onerous by prisoners, one effective way-and often, the only
way-to register a grievance may be simply not to obey them. Where the institution imposes no discipline, or punishes only after hearing a challenge to the reasonableness of
the rule which was not obeyed, it has in effect responded affirmatively to the grievance.
If an inmate, for example, is disciplined for refusing to obey an order of an officer, or
for "insolence" toward him, and he contends that the order was arbitrary or the product
of hostility, the procedure by which that hearing is conducted will have a substantial impact on the outcome. The disciplinary proceeding is in reality a means of responding to
his grievance regarding the officer's manner of dealing with him. Thus, the nature of the
disciplinary process has a significant effect in the area of prisoner grievances.
At the same time, there are reasons for keeping the subjects of grievance mechanisms
and disciplinary proceedings separate. First, failure to discipline is, at best, an indirect,
passive response to a grievance; and the most open, fair disciplinary hearing could be
only partially responsive to inmate grievances. Those not articulated by breaches of the
rules remain unanswered, and it is obviously unsatisfactory to foster a regime in which
violations of discipline are the only means to gain attention to a complaint. Beyond that,
disciplinary proceedings, just because they are "proceedings," are more congenial for
lawyers to think about than the more formless grievance "procedures"; one can be beguiled into giving major attention to an area just because one feels more at home with it.
This is not to say that procedure in disciplinary cases is not entitled to serious critical
thought; it is to say that there is much more to the issue of grievance mechanisms than can
be dealt with through such thought.
21 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974).
22 Id. at 2982 n. 19. The imposition of "lesser penalties such as the loss of privileges"
was held not subject to similar procedural restraint. Whether such penalties as changes in
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claimed violation must be provided, at least twenty-four hours in
advance of a hearing; (b) there must be a hearing at which the
respondent may appear in his defense, and at which he "should
be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in
his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly
hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals," 23 but this
protection is stated more as an exhortation24 to prison officials
than as a judicially enforceable requirement; (c) an inmate unable, because of illiteracy or the complexity of the issue, "to
collect and present the evidence necessary for an adequate comprehension of the case" should be free to seek the aid of a staff
member or a fellow inmate, perhaps one designated for such
purposes by the staff, but there is no constitutional right to
counsel; (d) an inmate found guilty must be given a written
statement as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for the
action taken, but there is no constitutional right to have adverse
evidence presented in person, nor a right of confrontation or
cross-examination; 25 (e) the composition and governing standards of the Adjustment Committee must be such as not to raise
extreme issues of partiality or arbitrary decisionmaking.
These requirements should call forth some reconsideration
of Adjustment Committee procedures within the Bureau of
Prisons, but will probably fall short of mandating any real
change through judicial proceedings. The requirements of written notice of the charges and decision are already embodied in
policy and practice. 26 The Adjustment Committee is now required not to include staff members personally involved in the
case, and is subject to general standards meant to guide its
discretion.27 The right to call witnesses is granted by regulations
only before the Good Time Forfeiture Board; 28 fidelity to the
spirit of Wolff v. McDonnell suggests that the Bureau consider
seriously whether it would indeed be "unduly hazardous" to exhousing, custody or job assignment would be deemed "major" or "lesser" is left by the
Court for another day.
23Id.at 2979.
24 Id. at 2979-80. For a similar reading of the Court's opinion by Justices Marshall
and Douglas, see id. at 2987-89 & 2993-94.
25Id. at 2979-82.
26 POLICY STATEMENT 7400.5B, supra note 3, §§ 5(c)(1), 5(c)(5).
27
1d. §§ 5(b), 5(c)(1).
28See POLICY STATEMENT 7400.6A, supra note 7, § 4). No comparable statement
appears in the Bureau statement on disciplinary hearings. See POLICY STATEMENT 7400.5B,
supra note 3.
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tend this limited 2 9 right to serious Adjustment Committee cases.
Similarly, the right of staff-member representation is accorded
only before the Forfeiture Board; 30 here, the Court's language is
less plainly precatory only, and the regulations should be
changed to accord representatidn in Adjustment Committee
hearings, at least in the rather limited circumstances described
by the Court. For the most part, however, the reform of disciplinary procedures is now one for debate and resolution on
the policy level.
In my view, the most important single "reform" is one that
has already been instituted (and on which the Court was least
equivocal), and that apparently is being followed fairly faithfully:
the requirement that all discipline be initiated by a written
charge, investigated by a correctional supervisor. It is impossible
to overestimate the importance of such a protection. If officers
are required to make charges in writing, their discretion is
enormously checked, even without regard to what follows. At
least as important, the feeling of the inmates that they are subject to the absolute rule of each guard is very substantially affected. Of less importance, but very far from being trivial, are
the other aspects of Adjustment Committee procedure described
above, seeking to insure that the inmate knows of the charge,
that he is not kept in segregation for long periods without being
brought before the committee, and that he has an opportunity to
appear before a decision is made. A right to call witnesses in
Adjustment Committee hearings should be afforded to the same
extent, at least in serious cases, as it is before the Good Time
Forfeiture Board; the power given the chairman to reject requests to call witnesses meets any legitimate ground for concern.
I believe that, although there is much in Adjustment Committee practice that is rather startling to a lawyer, it would not be
terribly productive to accord the right of confrontation (by prohibiting the use of the incident report as evidence) or, still less, to
require that legal representation be made available. Given the
realities of prison life, so long as the Adjustment Committee
hears the case the right of confrontation would not markedly
change results, and the presence of a lawyer would probably
only hurt the inmate. 3'
29 The chairman may decline to call 'unnecessary" or repetitive witnesses, but must
note in writing his reasons for doing so.
30Pou1cY STATEMENT 7400.6A, supra note 5, §§ 4(d) & (e).
31I may well be wrong here, especially as to confrontation, but staff opposition
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There is one "reform" which, if added to these, would make
a substantial change indeed-to require that impartial hearing
examiners, such as those provided for in Section Seven of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 3 2 hear and decide the cases. That
would be nearly the equivalent of abolishing disciplinary proceedings as we now know them. I say this because, as I tried to
show above, Adjustment Committee proceedings are a central
part of a managerial-control process. One can well argue that
they should not be that, but it would be disingenuous to support
a hearing-examiner proposal simply as a means of improving
grievance machinery.
To be skeptical, as I am, about the likely utility of lawyers in
many disciplinary cases is not to say that some kind of informed
input from the inmate's perspective would not often be crucial.
An expansion of the right of staff-member representation to
Adjustment Committee proceedings would often make a real
difference.3 3 Beyond that, were prisons to develop paralegal inmate assistance, 34 an inmate could be afforded the assistance of
inmate representation should he desire it. Someone who knows
prison life, and who has had some experience with other cases,
can perform an invaluable mediatory function on behalf of an
inmate. For example, one case I observed involved an inmate
who refused to report for work. The hearing made evident that
he had an outstanding request for a transfer out of the kitchen,
to which the case manager simply had not responded, and was
resorting to nullification of his assignment as a remedy. The case
called not so much for a strictly legal defense, even less for any
pyrotechnical displays of advocacy, but for a friendly, informed
attempt to work out the problem. Often Adjustment Committee
members will do this, but it is obvious that they can be only
episodically reliable as a genuine help to the inmate. Correctional counselors might be given such a role, but there are obvious tensions between their staff role and their capacity for providing genuine inmate oriented input. The prison authorities
to these changes is so great that Woff v. McDonnell assures that they will not soon be
seriously considered in any event.
32 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1970).
33It is at this point that I most share the view expressed by Justice Marshall that a
more balanced sensitivity to the conflicting interests involved would have produced a
somewhat stricter constitutional requirement than that laid down by the Court. Wolff v.
McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2992 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
34 For a discussion of inmate paralegal training, see text accompanying notes 48 & 49,
infra.
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presently do not regard Adjustment Committee proceedings as
appropriate for even staff-member representation, and would
certainly have more difficulty accepting the idea of another inmate as a representative. There are of course clear dangers in
permitting inmates to play the advocate's role, which would be a
potent source of power within the institution. The question is
whether those fears warrant total refusal to experiment seriously
with the idea. I think not; the concept might work, and where it
did, it would make a significant difference.
Finally, there is one important mode of discipline which has
to date not been brought fully within the regime of Adjustment
Committee proceedings. Inmates presently are not given the
same procedural protections in connection with contemplated
transfers for "adjustment" reasons as they are in the case of
avowedly disciplinary matters, even though in any real sense
such a transfer is a form of discipline and has far-reaching effects on an inmate's life. 35 The Adjustment Committee is not
wholly uninvolved, since transfers almost always come up as a
result of some incident which has been brought to it. The committee does not, however, focus on transfer as a sanction, nor is
the inmate given any real opportunity to explore this at the
hearing. The committee simply intitiates consideration of transfer within the administration hierarchy; it is then pursued-by
the classification team or committee, the associate warden and
the warden, the central office and other institutions-without
the inmate's participation. In at least one institution, inmates expressed some fears that transfers were used punitively in cases
where discipline could not be justified. It is difficult to perceive
compelling objections to a proposal requiring that transfers for
adjustment reasons be treated in the same manner as other
sanctions.
B.

Third-Party Input

1. Arbitrators, Masters, et al.
There is one area in which an adjudicatory mode of thirdparty input clearly makes sense to me, but the reasons it does
serve to suggest its limits. I have in mind the resort to federal
35

It is unclear to what extent the procedures required by Wolffv. McDonnell will apply
to transfers. See Gomes v. Travisono, 490 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded
in light of Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S. Ct. 3200 (1974).
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court for claims based on the Bill of Rights. Here, a standard is
being invoked which is external to the values of the prison system yet generally recognized by society, and it is applied by an
institution of sufficient stature to gain the attention of prison
authorities. Indeed, judicial rulings establishing rights of association and religious observance, access to courts, freedom from
censorship and the like, have had an extensive impact on prison
life. I believe it would be a tragic error to devise "reforms" that
would transfer such cases from federal judges-whether the
transfer be to a judicial subaltern, such as a master, or to an
administrative body. If constitutional imperatives are to be
forced on prison bureaucracies, the force must come from an
institution with the stature to apply it.
It is unfortunate that much litigation is forced into a constitutional mold simply because of the unavailability of any other
avenue of redress. To say that a claim about the quality of food,
for example, is a frivolous constitutional claim is not to say that it
is a frivolous claim. And the fact that it is misdirected is hardly a
failing of the inmate, in a regime affording no other choice. Nor
is it an answer simply to provide for arbitral or quasi-arbitral
review, whether by an administrative agency or by ad hoc arbitrators chosen by the parties. To the extent that the basis of a
claim is a nonfrivolous constitutional interest, it belongs in court;
to the extent it is not, one must provide, not merely an alternative forum (to dismiss an ill-founded constitutional claim), but a
nonconstitutional standard as well.
While a number of prisoner grievances could reasonably be
cast as claims of noncompliance with applicable regulations, the
fact is that far more could not. So much of what is done in
prisons is a matter of management, of judgment, that it is inconceivable that one could devise a set of comprehensive written
standards which would make the matter simply one of invoking
them (or of proposing their amendment). Congressman Rangel
introduced a bill in 197 137 which contained an unusually complete set of standards-fifty numbered paragraphs covering
some fourteen pages of statute-to be applied by a quasi-judicial
36 There has been an enormous amount of writing in this area. See, e.g., H. KERPER

& J. KERPER,

LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED 277-489 (1974); SOUTH CAROLINA DEPART-

MENT OF CORRECTIONS, THE EMERGING RIGHTS OFTHE CONFINED (1972). See also RESOURCE
CENTER ON CORRECTIONAL LAW AND LEGAL SERVICES, PRISONERS' LEGAL RIGHTS: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CASES AND ARTICLES (2d

ed. 1973).

3" H.R. 11605, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) (proposed Prisoner Treatment Act).
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agency. Even this impressive set of rules would fall far short of
providing a standard by which many typical cases could be
judged: for example, the refusal to consider furloughing inmates approaching their release date, the question of inmate
participation in food selection, a decision to make an adverse
recommendation to the Board of Parole-these are ready illustrations of significant cases not covered by the bill. This is not to
say that they were oversights of the draftsmen; we are dealing
with decisions of a scope which simply cannot be reduced to
rules. Of course one could attempt to come up with extremely
broad and vague language to cover every kind of decision.
Prison authorities would be quite correct in saying that such an
approach simply delegates to the arbitrator authority to make
decisions which are managerial in nature.
Nor would prisoners be aided by a quasi-judicial model. It is
all too easy to dismiss a grievance as petty or frivolous, illfounded or malicious, simply because one concludes, albeit
rightly, that no violation of an existing standard has been made
out. Just as claims made in federal court must be made as constitutional claims, so claims made to an arbitrator must be made
as claims of breach of regulations. The fact is that many serious
grievances are not of this order. First, many involve a challenge
to the rule itself, although they may not be cast in this form
because the inmate may not know the rule or may think or
assume that he cannot cast it in such a form. A major failing of
the new policy statement on complaint procedures is that it does
not cover complaints which are answerable simply by reference
to an existing rule. I am sure that this is not inadvertent. But it
should be recognized that the federal prison service is an increasingly professional, competent, and self-analyzing bureaucracy. It
is an illusion to think that a major percentage of grievances
represent a failure to carry out existing regulations or standards.
In addition, one must take account of the fact that prison is
a "total institution," in many ways one of the most total. It is a
mistake, all too easy for lawyers to make, to look at a grievance
from the wrong end, that is, as it is presented for adjudication. If
there is available an adjudicatory mode of redress, complainants
will cast their complaints in a way suitable for that mode (just as
is now the case with federal court suits). Yet each grievance
arises out of a twenty-four-hour-per-day, seven-day-per-week
contact between prisoner and staff on nearly every level of the
prisoner's life. The case referred to above, concerning the unau-
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thorized kissing of one's wife, is simply an illustration of the
pervasiveness of regulation. It is explicitly prohibited by the policy statement on discipline for an inmate to possess "any thing
not authorized for retention or receipt by the inmate, and not
issued to him through regular institutional channels"; to refuse
"to obey an order of any staff member"; to engage in "[c]onduct
which disrupts or interferes with the security or orderly running
of the institution. ' 38 The point is not that these regulations are
oppressive, though they may be so, but that in such an environment what is needed is not an institution which can only respond
passively, whether favorably or otherwise, to a complainant's
claim.
For example, one case now pending in federal court seems
to raise the question of the right of an inmate to be present at a
classification hearing regarding a job change. What actually
happened, however, is instructive. The inmate was, in the view
of his work supervisor, an unsatisfactory employee, and the
supervisor asked Classification and Parole to remove him. Policy
is always to accede to such a request, leaving open only the
question where he should be reassigned. The inmate was
notified of a scheduled meeting to determine this, and in fact
appeared outside the chairman's door. He was told that it would
be some time until his case was reached and that he could go
elsewhere until called. Through a misunderstanding, he was
called, but he was not in a place where he could hear the call.
The committee then proceeded in his absence, and assigned
him to the kitchen. When he heard of their action, he protested,
and was told that he could have the matter reconsidered, but in
the meantime he was assigned to the kitchen. He refused to
work there, and now claims that the decision was invalid by reason of his absence.
Whether he wins or loses his case as a matter of procedural
due process, or whether indeed he would win or lose a similar
case brought before a nonjudicial arbitrator or board, it seems
obvious that such a decision would be unable to come to grips
with the real issue. Obviously, in one sense the case should never
have arisen; obviously, now that it has, it should be dealt with in
some nonadjudicatory manner. At least it seems obvious to me,
39
and the example is not an isolated one.
38 POLICY STATEMENT 7400.5B, supra note 3, § 4(B) (prohibited acts numbers 208,

256, 306).
39One might reasonably assert that an arbitrator could function in a nonadjudica-

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 123:1

Ombudsmen and Others4"
It may be that what I have written suggests simply that the
third-party input should not be analogous to that of a judge or
arbitrator. The ombudsman concept in many ways seems responsive to this insight. It provides an outside "force" that is
neither judicial in mode nor binding in its decisions. It is obviously an idea enjoying wide currency today, and much has been
written about its utility in the prison area. 4 My own sense is that
it is not a workable concept, for reasons I will try to develop
here.
One warden with whom I spoke said that he was the ombudsman for his prison. The present director of the Bureau of
Prisons has said that the General Counsel exercises an ombudsman-like function through the institution of the Prisoner's Mail
Box. 4 2 There is a sense in which both of these observations are
true: one can easily see that there are many cases where each
official exercises a review function which, by reason of different
perspective and higher rank, is similar to that which we associate
with an ombudsman. It does not denigrate the importance of
encouraging such attitudes and functions to observe that if the
notion of an ombudsman is to have any meaning, the position
cannot be fulfilled by an official, even a high official, of the
Bureau of Prisons.
First, an ombudsman must be, and must appear to be, independent of the prison bureaucracy. This twin goal seems impossible to achieve. The ombudsman must be responsible to someone. It might be possible to set up an office directly answerable
to the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice,
bypassing the Bureau of Prisons, or even perhaps in the Office
of the Comptroller General, bypassing the entire executive estab2.

tory manner. The Center for Correctional Justice, Washington, D.C., assists institutions interested in developing arbitral modes of grievance handling and has reported
at least one "successful" hearing at a state institution in Massachusetts. See also Coulson,
Justice Behind Bars: Time to Arbitrate, 59 A.B.A.J. 612 (1973). One should not lightly dismiss the potentialities of such a procedure, but I remain skeptical about its longer
range workability, for reasons set forth in the discussion of citizens' panels, Section
III(B)(3), Citizens' Panels infra.
40 The term is Walter Gellhorn's, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS' PROTECTORS
IN NINE COUNTRIES (1966), who not only made the word common coin in this country,
but in a few pages, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN: GOVERNMENTAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES
145-51 (1966), provided the point of departure for its consideration in the prison setting.
" See, e.g., T. FITZHARRIS, THE DESIRABILITY OF A CORRECTIONAL OMBUDSMAN
(1973); Tibbles, Ombudsmen for American Prisons, 48 N.D.L. REV. 383 (1972).
42See Hearings on Corrections, supra note 12 (statement of Norman Carlson).
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lishment and answerable to the Legislature. Even if such structures were administratively feasible, I question whether they
would accomplish their purpose. The problem, it seems to me,
lies in the tension between the need for independence and the
need to have an official who would be regarded by prison officials as knowledgeable, as not simply an outside force to be related to only as an adversary. Even as an ombudsman came to
play such a knowledgeable, nonadversarial role (assuming he
could), his success would spell failure from the other direction:
living, working, eating on a daily basis with the staff, he would
become but one more person working at the prison but not a
prisoner, perhaps overcoming the hostility of staff but surely
earning that of the inmates. The suspicion and mistrust is so
great on both sides that it seems far preferable to me to see
whether methods can be devised whereby an incipient institution
such as the correctional counselor-which has the extraordinary
virtue of having been created from within and having genuine
knowledge of prison life-might develop in some way which
provides genuine prisoner oriented input.
A second requirement is that the ombudsman be physically
present on a daily basis in the prison itself. This is essential
because the "caseload" is potentially enormous, and the prison
world is such that it is hopeless to expect someone not physically
on the scene regularly to get and remain in touch with the
realities from which grievances arise. 43 Proposals to establish
systemwide ombudsmen, setting up an august personage at a
desk in Washington, are simply an attempt to achieve a paper
solution at little cost, and should be recognized as no more than
public relations work.
A third requirement is that the office be conceived not as
arbitral but as exercising influence through a reportingadvising-publicizing function. I think it naive to hope that such a
person could operate effectively in the prison environment, even
if an individual of nationally recognized stature would take a
position working at a local penitentiary day-in and day-out
(and he would not). Priorities and attitudes regarding prison
administration are sufficiently polarized that an outsider cannot
influence events simply through the force of his or her office.
43 Lawyers' words, like "caseload," can too easily reinforce our tendency to lose sight
of the pervasive informality of the grievance process. A grievance is not to be analogized
to a lawsuit; it is simply a request or complaint about something, and in the "total institution" of prison there are literally thousands of "somethings" each year.
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We are not talking, at least not now in the federal system, about
systematic acts of physical brutality, subhuman standards of incarceration, or other practices the mere exposure of which
would generate a consensus of condemnation. To a limited but
significant degree, federal judges have the stature (a stature enhanced by the power of injunction) to inculcate, among prison
authorities, respect for constitutional values. When one seeks to
go, as one must, substantially beyond that, the inadequacy of the
concept seems patent.
It has been suggested that an ombudsman-like function be
performed by masters or other officials designated by the court.
To the extent that such officials would operate as surrogate
judges deciding constitutionally based causes of action, the idea
seems to me self-defeating, both because the constitution is too
narrow a base and because the stature of the judge has been
needlessly lost. One proposal, however, suggests that the
sentencing judge be given authority and responsibility, going
beyond constitutional rights, to oversee the conditions under
which persons sentenced by him are incarcerated-that (in effect) the sentencing judge in one sense having created the prob44
lem, prisoners be regarded as wards of the sentencing court.
There is much in this notion that is worth serious thought; two
substantial problems with it are the physical distance between the
sentencing judge and the prisoner and the incompatability between the tradition of the judge as a passive adjudicator and the
necessity (as it appears to me) for the official in question to play
a more active, nonadjudicatory role.
The foregoing illustrates that one cannot speak meaningfully of the general idea that the Bureau of Prisons establish "an
ombudsman." The varieties of mechanisms by which this might
be done are so manifold, and the suspicion and conflicts which
underlie varying hopes and concerns regarding the idea are so
great, that either such a proposal would die aborning or, if
something was later implemented called an ombudsman project,
it might have as little responsiveness to the actualities and complexities of the problem as the notion of the warden as ombudsman.

44 Singer, Prisonersas Wards of the Court-A NonconstitutionalPath to Assure Correctional
Reform by the Courts, 41 U. CINN. L. REv. 769 (1972).
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3. Citizens' Panels
Input from interested private citizens can take a number of
forms, some of which are essentially variants of the arbitral and
"ombudsman" notions discussed above and some of which are
closer to simple observers or mediators. It can be of great value
in the relatively closed and isolated world of corrections to have
an "outside" perspective. I do not know of an institution, however, where such input has been structured in such a way that it
operates as an ongoing force.
At one state penitentiary, visited because of its inmate representation committees, a Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC)
was constituted. Inmates were given an equal voice with the administration in the selection of the members of the CAC. It was
agreed that the group would have full access to information and
a wide-ranging responsibility to offer solutions to problems
within the institution and to advise the public as to the needs of
the prison and of the inmates. The instrument creating it asserted that "staff and residents [inmates] are obliged in all cases
to pay particular heed to their counsel."
The idea failed. The original CAC members resigned out of
frustration over their ineffectiveness, and the group has not
been reconstituted (although efforts to do that were recently in
process). It dealt with some basic issues-inadequacy of treatment and training facilities, lack of opportunities to demonstrate
readiness for lesser security or for release, lack of training and
guidance available to guards, antagonism toward the Parole
Board and its processes-but, like so many promising efforts, it
produced only "one more report." One should not over-generalize from a single experience, but the failure of the CAC was
consistent with the difficulties such a conception would inevitably face. An outside group cannot be given real power, nor
can its recommendations be expected to trigger the sustained
institutional or public reaction necessary to bring about their
implementation.
C. Inmate and Inmate-RepresentativeInput
1. The Inhibiting Effect of Present Correctional Attitudes
What is missing from everything which exists to date in the
grievance processes, and in most of the proposals that have been
floated abroad recently, is genuine input from the inmate. The
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federal prison service is quite up-to-date and professional in its
recognition of the importance of keeping lines of communication open, of attempting, within the inevitable confines of the
work it has to carry out, to make available people to whom inmates may bring their complaints and requests and who can give
them answers, and even reasons. But the prevailing correctional
philosophy makes it inevitable that prison authorities feel no
need to view inmate complaints or requests as occasions for serious rethinking of rules, assumptions, or attitudes. The inmate is
a malefactor, a "sociopath," a person already demonstrated to be
unable to handle his own affairs in a socially acceptable and
personally rewarding way. In one way after another, prison authorities equate rehabilitation with the passive and unquestioning acceptance of the norms of the prison.
One warden illustrated this in speaking of a proposal to
permit inmates to choose what should be done with "excess"
funds. Were the prisoners to be told that so much money was
newly available this year and asked what they thought it should
be spent on, he said, they would probably choose strawberries
and ice cream for dessert and color TV sets rather than another
psychiatrist. He viewed the unwisdom, indeed the childishness,
of such a priority as self-evident. My point is not that the prisoners are right and he wrong-although I should confess to harboring leanings in that direction-but that they might be right
and that the difference would reflect varying priorities and
perspectives, which should call for a variety of inputs into the
decisionmaking process.
It seems reasonably clear that the new complaint procedure
will not provide, indeed is not set up to provide, any such variety
of inputs. The procedure may prove quite effective in enabling
inmates to learn why certain action has been taken and, where
line officials have breached established regulations, to obtain
some indication that the breach will not be repeated. However,
all of that falls far short of a reexamination of the rationale for
the action complained of. The Bureau reported that, during the
four-month period in which the new procedure was being employed experimentally, nearly one-third of the requests were
"granted." However, an examination of the actual completed
forms at one institution made clear that such a result was obtainable only because many of the inmate requests were cast
in the form of an inquiry into the reason for a certain action,
rather than a request to have the action reconsidered. The an-
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swer in one sense granted the request (that is, for information),
while it did not grant relief on the underlying objection.
2.

Inmate Councils

In large measure, my preference for inmate-oriented modes
of input reflects a belief that they can more easily take on a
nonadjudicatory character. The characteristic of prisons as "total
institutions" counsels an approach which interacts in an ongoing
way between inmate and administration, is not limited to the
assertion of claims of legal entitlement, and is flexible and capable of adaption to changing attitudes and problems.
The most flexible, adaptive mode of obtaining inmate input
is through an inmate council or representation committee. It is
enormously difficult for a representation model to be applied to
prison life. Much about the psychological imperatives of prison
makes it difficult, perhaps impossible, for prisoners to act in a
representative or concerted way; and there is a danger of misuse
of the process by those who come to a position of leadership.
Beyond that, the entire submissiveness which the correctional
philosophy encourages is defied by the concept of "negotiations"; even without a credible threat of work stoppages, prison
authorities will find enormous difficulties in dealing with inmates who are assertive and argumentative in seeking their objectives, who not only question practices but persist in pursuing
the matter beyond the initial explanation for a negative reply,
who ask why long-followed priorities must indeed be regarded as
dispositive.
Nearly all wardens and prison staff in the federal service
are opposed to any concept of inmate councils, and regard their
opposition as reflective of recent concrete experience. They assert that, whoever is chosen initially, leadership soon passes into
the hands of "antiadministration" prisoners who take an insatiably combative view of things and seek an ongoing power
struggle with the administration. As a result, dealings with inmate councils never placate and satisfy inmates as much as they
stir them up and generate belligerency, and work stoppages have
commonly followed a period of active inmate organization. At
the same time, the Bureau has encouraged continued experimentation with "inmate communication committees," that is,
with modes of structuring inmate expression of views that lack
the "bargaining" connotation so distasteful to prison officialdom.
For their part, the inmates' perception is that work stoppages are
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the result, rather than the cause, of administrative defensiveness
and unresponsiveness.
The problem is not wholly one of attitudes; formidable difficulties would attend a serious attempt to structure an inmatecouncil mode of grievance handling. I have referred to the problems in expecting incarcerated men to act in a representative
way. An additional major sticking-point would be the mode of
selection of any inmate committee; most prison officials are
strongly opposed to letting free inmate choice control (although
that seems to have been done at one institution) and there are
obvious difficulties with the credibility of an inmate group
selected by the staff. There are wide varieties of selection
methods, however, and the evolution of a council at a specific
facility would be responsive to the particular imperatives of that
place and time. An attempt to construct a systemwide model is
unnecessary, indeed would be foolish.
The prison with the most well-known representation committee is the Washington State Penitentiary at Walla Walla, and
an attempt was made to get some first-hand impressions of that
experience. In 1971 a "Constitution for Self-Government" was
adopted, under which the Resident Government Council (RGC)
was created. Inmates and administration agreed that the development was not a result of inmate initiatives. Rather, the decision to institute "resident government" seems to have come from
a state official. In fact, it appears that initially not only the
guards but the inmates as well resented the imposition of this
general concept on the prison by officials in Olympia.
The Council is made up of eleven members representing
the general population and seven members representing the
minimum security building, both groups being elected from
their respective populations on nominations signed by at least
twenty residents and certified by the superintendent.
Enumerated responsibilities and duties of the RGC include:
1) to seek implementation of rehabilitation programs; 2) to represent the population to the superintendent and the public; 3) to
plan and organize, with the approval of the superintendent, social and business occasions involving the entire population; 4) to
keep the residents informed and politically active and to call
assemblies whenever desirable, with the approval of the superintendent and the public; 5) to improve the institution environment, improve communications between residents and the public, aid in short and long range planning, review and confirm

1974]

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL PRISONS

resident-organized programs, and provide input into any rehabilitation program proposed by the administration, staff, or
population; 6) to review all major grievances from each resident
and act upon those grievances; 7) to be responsible for public
relations; and 8) to seek redress in courts when appropriate.
In pursuing these responsibilities the Council offers input
into the decisionmaking process. In less significant areas the
RGC may make the initial "decision," subject to administration
approval. As significance increases, the RGC offers input and
proposals, but the decision rests entirely with the administration.
It would be naive to expect things to be otherwise.
Within the RGC itself are contained a number of committees, chaired by an RGC member and staffed by appointed inmates. They are responsible directly to the RGC and report at
regular RGC business meetings and offer proposals at agenda
meetings. An agenda meeting takes place each month. At these
meetings agenda proposals are presented and explained by various committee chairmen (who are also RGC members). If an
agenda proposal is approved by the Council, that proposal is
then presented to the administration. In addition, the superintendent or his designees meet with nine Council members
weekly for a "rap session" and the Council itself holds regular
business meetings in order to handle minor problems, individual
grievances and suggestions, and general business.
Arguments in support of proposals made or grievances
submitted are offered in the written instruments themselves, and
are expanded upon orally at the weekly "rap sessions." The administration will usually take the matter into consideration and
announce a decision at the next weekly staff meeting, which
RGC representatives are allowed to attend as observers. Occasionally, when the superintendent believes that a certain proposal or grievance requires greater attention, the issue involved
might be discussed at the staff meeting and a decision postponed. All decisions are to be accompanied by reasons.
A subsidiary inmate group, called the People's Action
Cc.mmittee (PAC), has been given the responsibility of handling
individual grievances. While inmates traditionally take their requests to a staff counselor initially, the RGC encourages them to
go to PAC first. The PAC, which is specifically constituted so as
to include all ethnic or racial groups, has several advantages as a
grievance committee. First, when a resident contacts the PAC
and it presents the request to a counselor, the likelihood of a
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favorable disposition in cases involving discretion (for example,
visitor or phone privileges) is thought to be increased. Second,
if the request cannot be granted under existing regulations, the
inmate is more likely to accept such an explanation from the
PAC. Third, in a dispute involving only inmates, the PAC, again
because of its peer status, seems more able to resolve it than
the counselor.
The general opinion seems to be that the PAC is becoming
an effective individual grievance handler. A staff official estimates that sixty percent of all grievances are dealt with satisfactorily at the PAC level. If, however, the inmate is dissatisfied, he
can take the grievance to the RGC itself. Although the grievance
is technically individual, at this point the issue is usually framed
as a challenge to some institutional policy or as a proposal for
change, and the RGC would follow the general procedure outlined earlier.
From one perspective, the establishment of the RGC and
PAC manifests an extraordinary degree of recognition of inmate
organization, and certainly no counterparts exist in the federal
service. Members of the Council and the PAC have "official"
duties, identification cards, and offices. A PAC representative is
entitled to be present at "shakedowns," and shares responsibility
for policing the visiting room. When RGC proposals are accepted by the administration, they are not promulgated unilaterally, but as jointly authorized announcements, or as RGC proposals approved by the administration, and bear signatures of
inmates as well as staff. RGC leadership has the authority to call
meetings of groups of inmates, an act that would be regarded as
an extreme threat in most other prisons. Experimental proposals
have been approved for such reforms as limited RGC representation at Adjustment Committee hearings and in the screening
process for eligibility for minimum security custody. In all of
these ways, there is a genuine collective inmate "presence" at
Walla Walla-enough so that the informal feeling of federal officials at the nearby MacNeil Island facility is that the inmates
have "taken over" the institution.
In fact, however, most of the issues with which RGC has
dealt are less central to staff control over inmate life than are
discipline and classification. Typical RGC proposals have been
for the institution of evening visiting hours, greater choice of
style of shoes which inmates may select, introduction of a change
machine in the visiting room, increase in the tobacco ration,
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establishment of a radio station, revision of the criteria for eligibility for minimum custody, and introduction of daytime "outside" visiting rights. Yet, so long as the prison administration is
willing to tolerate-and insists that the staff tolerate-the inmate
assertiveness which the RGC system involves, it will appear to
those preferring the classic style of inmate demeanor that discipline and order have become unstuck. So long as the prison
administrators have the actual discretion to reject any
proposal-as, short of binding arbitration or a legitimization of
work stoppages, they do-it will appear to many inmates that the
process is a form of tokenism, a sham or charade.
If the administrative opposition to inmate councils could
properly be called wholly paranoid, one would be saying that the
forms and modes of participation of a system like the Walla
Walla RGC make no substantive difference at all-one should
not fear to adopt the idea, for it means nothing. To the extent
that one believes that inmate councils can provide genuine input,
one must acknowledge that he or she is asking prison officials to
share power, if only to a relatively minor degree. It remains true,
however, that the substantive change, if any, will be very slight,
that no grievance procedure worth talking about can be only talk,
and that the dichotomy between substantive matters of correctional philosophy and a concern for a viable and meaningful
grievance procedure therefore cannot be absolutely leakproof. A
grievance procedure with at least the hope of justifying its existence must have some genuine inmate input, going beyond the
fact of the complaint or request. In my judgment, an inmatecouncil mode of supplying that input has the potential to succeed in doing so in a way that responds to the realities of prison
life. Experience, even at Walla Walla, suggests that the danger is
far greater that the idea will die for doing too little than for
doing too much. A recent publication of the South Carolina
Department of Corrections makes the point ably:
This term [participation] means little more than the notion that those who are allowed a voice in the rulemaking process are more likely to obey such rules. It
does not mean that the prisons would be run by a town
meeting of the cell blocks or even that there would be
any real power given to inmates to control the prisons.
All that is implied by the notion is that at some point
along the line, the inmate, either individually or
through a representative, is allowed to make a meaning-
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ful input into the decision-making process that surrounds him with rules. One means of accomplishing
this goal would be the establishment of an inmate council with elected representatives. Such a council should
be able to present questions to the administration concerning various rules and practices of the institution
and receive a straightforward answer. If such an answer
cannot be given, then there should be serious doubt
concerning the utility of the rule. The inmate council
would then be able to accept the explanation or suggest
alternatives for the consideration of the administrators.
Through a series of long range dialogues between inmates and administrators, many of the problems which
plague our prisons could be worked out. While such a
system is clearly not a panacea, perhaps through good
faith and responsible efforts much of the mistrust and
paranoia that pervade our prisons can be alleviated, and
a much healthier and rehabilitative atmosphere would
prevail. [Inmate] participation does not contemplate the
removal of authority from the prison administrators; it
only provides a means by which the inmates can feel
that, and it would actually be that, they are to some
degree still responsible for their futures.45
3. Paralegal Training
Even if a method were devised whereby inmate committees
met with staff over grievances, there would be many grievances
not susceptible to such treatment; individual inmates often lack
the resources and skills needed to carry out the task of presenting their requests effectively. Legal assistance seems to me to be
central to the existence of a viable grievance procedure. Indeed,
in many circumstances the availability of legal assistance is itself
the means by which a grievance can be resolved, as for example
with respect to the widespread problem of detainers4 6 which
inmates are unable to clear up on their own.
However, it would be illusory to expect that a method could
be devised to make lawyers or law students genuinely available in
most prisons. In part this is a problem of remoteness of the
institutions. If the day comes when we stop building large
facilities in out of the way places, we can perhaps begin to take
the next step in thinking about making lawyers available, but
" THE

EMERGING RIGHTS OF THE CONFINED,

"See note 15 supra.

supra note 27, at 94.
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obviously that day is not in sight. My own feeling is that prisonbased programs 4 7 are bound to be ill-fated, for reasons to which
I have already alluded: excessive litigation bias and developing
staff orientation. However, I have no great confidence in the
correctness of this judgment. The state of Kansas recently began
an interesting program, whereby inmates may mail complaints to
a corrections official outside the prison or to the warden, who is
required to conduct an investigation. If this does not produce a
solution satisfactory to the inmate, the matter is referred to an
independent LEAA-funded corporation which has the services
of one-and-a-half staff attorneys as well as law professors and
law students.4 8 It attempts to mediate the dispute at the lowest
possible level, and contemplates legal action only where this is
unsuccessful. The question remains how such a program operates in practice, given the demands of nearly limitless case loads,
the institutionalization of the office, attorney identification with
prison staff, and other problems of this sort.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that legal assistance stops with the provision of a lawyer or law student. The
notion which I think has the greatest promise is that of training
inmates themselves to provide paralegal assistance. The potential
is there for inmates to assist one another in a wide range of areas
such as detainers, information about recurring civil legal problems, and postconviction matters, in which there is an enormous
need for legal services-grievances, if you will, which are presently going unresolved for lack of help in pursuing them. If
lawyers would put their minds to devising appropriate training
mechanisms, a group of inmates could be equipped to serve a
number of people far greater than the lawyers themselves could
possibly serve. Here, the specialized, repetitive level of much of
the work, which makes it difficult to structure a successful
lawyers' assistance program, is exactly the characteristic that
makes it possible to think about a paralegal program. Such training could also be useful to inmates who serve on inmate councils
or in other ways raise grievances internal to the prison. I do not
have in mind training inmates to make legal claims against
prison authorities. What is needed, as I have indicated, is a more
flexible approach that can go beyond the assertion of legal
47 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
"IThe program is described in NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL,
PRISON GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES

7-8 (1973).
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rights, that is simply training in advocacy, although of course
inmates so trained will at the same time be able to invoke any
applicable prison regulations in support of a request or complaint.
Two state prison programs involving inmate paralegal training were visited. The first, at a state correctional institution in
Pennsylvania, was initiated and is operated almost entirely by
inmates; the second, at a New York state facility, was established
by lawyers and law students affiliated with a nearby law school.
There are now thirty-one full-time employees working in
the Paraprofessional Law Clinic in Pennsylvania. There is an
office on every cell block. These offices are staffed by one regular employee, considered to be fully trained and competent, and
one trainee. In addition, there is a central office for administration and maintenance of a library. Finally, there is a governing
board, consisting of five members from the internal staff and
four external members, who are often lawyers.
The Clinic is substantially self-governing, with the board establishing policy and operational guidelines. In addition to the
policymaking functions exercised by the board, the chairman
(who is an inmate) has broad powers, including making all hiring
and firing decisions and the administration of training programs
and of the Clinic itself.
From the beginning, the program of the Clinic has contained some significant limitations. First, it was to handle no civil
or anti-institution cases and no cases where an inmate was already represented by counsel. Second, as a Law Clinic, it was not
to become involved in any internal prison disputes. This meant
that, generally speaking, they were free to do "convictionrelated" things. By August, 1972, the Clinic was providing the
following services: preparing state appeals, obtaining notes of
testimony and other court records for inmates, obtaining time
credit for time spent awaiting trial, having untried detainers
dismissed or listed for trial, preparing post-conviction and
habeas petitions, and occasionally preparing federal appeals.
Of these, the Clinic feels it has been very successful in obtaining court records or time credit and in dealing with detainers. It seems to have had some success with habeas and postconviction petitions but so far has only rarely been successful
with appeals.
Recently the Clinic has begun to step outside the original
restrictions mentioned earlier. It now handles domestic relations
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and civil actions of all kinds. Officially, it still does not handle
anti-institution suits; however, in practice these suits are undertaken when an individual resident has been wronged (for example, where a resident has been discharged from the hospital
earlier than he should have been). In these individual suits
against the institution the Clinic will advise the resident and
draw up the complaint and other necessary papers. The only
difference here is that the complaint is not "sealed" by the Law
Clinic (signifying that the resident is represented by the Clinic),
but rather the suit is filed pro se. According to Clinic members,
the administration's reaction to this has been reasonable-it has
asked only that the superintendent be contacted first to see-if a
solution can be reached without resort to legal action.
In fact, then, the only "anti-institution" limit still observed is
that the Clinic will not file an anti-institution class action. Where
a guard was killed and the entire population was punished, the
Clinic, after unsuccessful attempts at dealing with the administration, decided that it was not possible to pursue legal remedies.
The limitation on involvement in internal disputes has also
begun to diminish. By administrative directive, an inmate has the
right to choose any staff member or inmate in the general population to assist him in presenting his case at a disciplinary hearing. Although the administration interprets this as not allowing
an inmate to choose the Clinic itself, it does recognize that an
inmate may choose one who happens to be Chairman of the
Clinic. In fact, the present chairman and vice-chairman estimate
that they have appeared before the hearing committee nearly
thirty times each as representative for other residents.
However, there seems to be agreement that representation
by the Clinic actually hurts the "accused" rather than helps him.
A senior staff officer went so far as to say that such representation assures one of a maximum penalty, primarily because the
Clinic representatives tend to provoke the hearing committee
members. Clinic officers explain the same tendency toward
harsher penalties largely in terms of the hostile attitudes of individual members of the hearing committee.
The only procedure existing for airing an individual grievance is a request slip to the superintendent; here, the policy
against Clinic involvement in internal disputes seems largely observed. The one function the Clinic does serve in this regard is
to write up the request slip for an inmate who feels unable to do
so himself. The Clinic in no way negotiates or deals with the
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administration over nonlegal, minor grievances. This is so even
though Clinic members are in complete agreement as to the
inadequacy of the request slip procedure.
Clinic members are almost completely self-trained. Most of
this training is accomplished simply by having the trainee work
in a block office with a regular Clinic employee. However, there
are also classes taught by the most experienced of the Clinic
members. In addition to this, in most major cases lawyers who
are external members of the board are contacted and consulted
for advice.
The New York example is rather different. Operated by a
law school's Women's Prison Project, its basic goal is to train
jailhouse lawyers and assist the inmates (who are women) in
identifying areas of legal need and in receiving legal representation. In practice, the project consists of two fairly independent
components, the teaching of weekly classes and the provision of
legal services.
Classes are taught primarily in "conviction-related" areas
such as search and seizure, right to counsel, appeals, postconviction and habeas corpus relief, although they cover other
areas of interest, such as divorce and custody, and prisoners'
rights. Interest has apparently been highest in "convictionrelated" areas and lowest in the area of prisoners' rights. The
project director believes that this represents less a feeling that
there are no complaints than a pervasively passive attitude toward the possibilities for change. Even in classes where attendance is highest there have been problems maintaining continuity because of high turnover. Because of these factors, the
Project has so far failed to develop any organization within the
institution itself which might evolve into a clinic of the type existing in Pennsylvania.
The Project is allowed to represent persons at parole revocation hearings, but not at release hearings or at internal disciplinary proceedings. It does as much as it can in regard to disciplinary proceedings. This includes making sure that an inmate has a
copy of the rules and regulations and a summary of the reasons
for the hearing. Often, however, a person is placed in segregation and given a hearing before the Project has been notified.
Finally, the Project is not authorized to become involved in
individual grievances. There is no established grievance procedure except to contact one's counsellor. In practice, the Project
seems to have become involved in individual grievances as sort of
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a combination advocate-ombudsman. It believes that it has been
quite successful in this capacity, especially in regard to furloughs.
Inmates with grievances are allowed to write letters to appropriate administrative personnel, but no response is guaranteed.
The Project, therefore, advises an inmate to send a letter first.
Then, when no reply is received, a student lawyer will go to the
administration with the grievance. This approach has greatly reduced the likelihood that the Project lawyer will be informed
that she is involved where she has no authority to be. Rather,
once the inmate has exhausted what little there is in the way of
procedures, the tendency has been to accept the Project lawyer
as an advocate ombudswoman.
It seems clear that the greater availability of legal or
paralegal assistance would do much to aid in the resolution of
inmate grievances. In considering what steps might aid in bringing about such a result, several conditioning factors need to be
borne in mind: (1) Lawyers cannot be made available in any
quantity approaching need, even on an episodic basis. (2) Law
students probably cannot be made sufficiently available in an
ongoing way. (3) Efforts which train inmates have an investment
potential, which mere ' legal assistance" lacks. (4) The likelihood
that law trained inmates can be of real assistance in internal
grievances (including disciplinary proceedings) depends on local
dynamics, including the personnel involved, both inmates and
staff, but the inmates themselves, if trained, can respond flexibly
to the utility or disutility of handling internal as well as external
matters.

49

The Bureau of Prisons, which has consistently tried to work
with law student programs where they can be generated, is not
unsympathetic to the concept of inmate paralegal training. It is
concerned over the implicit recognition given selectees for such a
program, and (as always) fears self-selection of the "wrong kind"
of inmate for such training. These concerns can fairly readily be
given weight in the shaping of a program, and do not warrant
wholesale rejection of the idea. The Bureau should attempt to
institute a program of paralegal training in one or two institutions on an experimental basis, and thereafter more broadly.
49 For a discussion, see RESOURCE CENTER ON CORRECTIONAL LAW AND LEGAL STUDIES,
INMATE INVOLVEMENT IN PRISON LEGAL SERVICES: RULES AND TRAINING OPTIONS FOR

THE INMATE AS PARALEGAL (1974) (ABA Comm'n on Correctional Facilities and Services); Resource Center on Correctional Law and Legal Services, supra note 16.
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The most feasible way of doing this would be to contract with an
outside organization to develop such a program. Groups which
have an expertise and interest in the area include the Center for
Correctional Justice, the Resource Center on Correctional Law
and Legal Services of the ABA Commission on Correctional
Facilities and Services, the National Center for Disputes Settlement of the American Arbitration Association, the Committee
on Library Service to Prisoners of the American Association of
Law Libraries, and any of a number of law schools and legal
services programs.

